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Abstract. The paper concerns a model of influence in which agents make their decisions on a
certain issue. It is assumed that each agent is inclined to make a particular decision, but due to
a possible influence of the others, his final decision may be different from his initial inclination.
Since in reality the influence does not necessarily stop after one step, but may iterate, we present a
model which allows us to study the dynamic of influence. The use of continuous variables permits the
application of differential equations systems to the analysis of the convergence of agents’ decisions
in long-time. In particular, by applying the approach based on differential equations to the influence
model, we recover the results of the discrete model on classical influence functions, and the results
on the boss and approval sets for the command games equivalent to some influence functions.
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1 Introduction
The phenomenon of influence between individuals or, more broadly, influence of a group
of agents on an individual, is studied carefully in numerous works, e.g., in psychology,
sociology, economics, and mathematics. The economics literature offers several surveys
of different models of influence and of different approaches to this phenomenon; see,
e.g., Jackson (2008), Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010d), Rusinowska (2010).
Some of the works on influence and interaction, in particular in the game theoretical
literature, are one-step models. In reality, however, the influence does not necessarily stop
after one step, but may iterate. Consequently, in order to study the iteration of influence,
different dynamic models of influence are proposed by sociologists and economists. One
of the leading works of opinion formation is introduced in DeGroot (1974). In that model,
individuals start with initial opinions on a subject and place some weights on the current
beliefs of other agents in forming their own beliefs for the next period. These beliefs
⋆ Emmanuel Maruani was a student at the Universite´ de Paris 1 and Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chausse´es
when this research has been conducted. Michel Grabisch and Agnieszka Rusinowska acknowledge support by
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are updated over time. Several other authors study the DeGroot model and propose its
generalizations, in particular, models in which the updating of beliefs can vary in time
and circumstances; see e.g. Berger (1981), DeMarzo et al. (2003), Krause (2000), Lorenz
(2005), Friedkin and Johnsen (1990, 1997), Jackson (2008), Golub and Jackson (2010).
A related dynamic framework of influence is also presented in Asavathiratham (2000),
Asavathiratham et al. (2001) and Koster et al. (2010).
A cooperative approach to influence is presented in Hu and Shapley (2003b,a), where
the command structure is applied to model players’ interaction relations by simple games.
Boss sets and approval sets for a player are defined, and based on these sets a simple game
called the command game for the player is constructed. Also the concept of command
function is defined. The authors introduce an authority distribution over an organization
and define the authority equilibrium equation. In particular, they consider multi-step
commands, where commands can be implemented through command channels.
The present paper is related to another framework of influence originally introduced
in Hoede and Bakker (1982) and later refined in our several works. In the original one-step
model, agents have to make their acceptance-rejection decision on a certain issue. Each
agent has an inclination to say either YES or NO, but due to a possible influence of the
other agents, his final decision (YES or NO) may be different from his initial inclination.
Our first results concerning this model are presented in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010a)
where we investigate several tools to analyze the influence. In particular, we define the
influence indices to measure the influence of a coalition on an agent, introduce several
influence functions and study their properties, investigate the concept of a follower of
a coalition. In Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010b) we generalize the YES-NO model of
influence to a framework in which each agent has an ordered set of possible actions,
and in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010c) we assume a continuum of actions. Our results
presented in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2009) concern a comparison of the influence model
with the framework of command games (Hu and Shapley (2003b,a)). We show that our
framework of influence is more general than the framework of the command games. In
particular, we define several influence functions which capture the command structure.
For some influence functions we define the equivalent command games. In Grabisch and
Rusinowska (Forthcoming 2011) we establish exact relations between the key concepts
of the influence model and the framework of command games. More precisely, we study
the relations between: influence functions and follower functions, command games and
command functions, and between command games and influence functions.
There are also some studies of the dynamic of influence in the model mentioned above,
i.e., the model of initial inclinations and final decisions. In Grabisch and Rusinowska
(2010e) the YES-NO model with a single step of mutual influence is generalized to a
framework with iterated influence. We analyze the decision process in which the mutual
influence does not stop after one step but iterates, and we study the convergence of
an influence function. In particular, we investigate stochastic influence functions and
apply Markov chains theory to the analysis of such functions. Also in the framework of
influence with a continuum of actions (Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010c)), where we study
in particular linear influence functions, the convergence of the linear influence functions
in the iterated process is discussed.
The aim of the present paper is to apply another approach proposed in Maruani (2010)
to study the dynamic of influence. We propose a dynamic model in which an agent gives
2
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a certain importance, reflected by a weight, to other agents in making his final decision.
Such a weight might be positive, negative, or equal to zero, which corresponds to the
stimulation, the inhibition, and the absence of relation, respectively. Furthermore, we
define the exhortation of an agent which is the weighted sum of the opinions that the
agent receives from the others. The opinions of the agents are updated over time and the
updating rule is based on the sign of the exhortation. The use of continuous variables
permits the application of differential equations systems to the analysis of the convergence
of agents’ decisions in long-time. By applying the approach based on differential equations
to the influence model, we recover the results of the discrete model on classical influence
functions, and the results on the boss and approval sets for command games equivalent
to some selected influence functions.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 the main concepts of the influence
model in question and the framework of command games are presented. In Section 3 we
introduce the dynamic model of influence. The dynamic of selected influence functions is
studied in Section 4. Section 5 concern followers in the dynamic model and under selected
influence functions. The analysis of the dynamic model in terms of command games, in
particular, the determination of the boss and approval sets in the presented framework
is delivered in Section 6. Concluding remarks are given in Section 7.
2 The model of influence and command games
2.1 Main concepts of the influence model
In this section we recapitulate main concepts of the YES-NO model of influence investi-
gated in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010a).
We consider a social network with the set of all players (agents, voters) denoted by
N := {1, ..., n}. Each player has to make an acceptance-rejection decision concerning a
certain issue, and he has an inclination to say either YES (denoted by +1) or NO (denoted
by −1). An inclination vector is denoted by I = (I1, ..., In), where Ik ∈ {−1,+1} indicates
the inclination of agent k, for each k ∈ N . For convenience, (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ {−1,+1}n is
denoted by 1N , (−1,−1, . . . ,−1) ∈ {−1,+1}
n by −1N , and mixed cases by (−1N\S, 1S).
It is assumed that agents may influence each other in the network, and due to the
influences the final decision of an agent may be different from his original inclination.
Formally, each inclination vector I ∈ {−1,+1}n is transformed into a decision vector
B(I) = (B1(I), ..., Bn(I)), where B : {−1,+1}
n → {−1,+1}n, I 7→ B(I) is the influence
function1, and Bk(I) indicates the decision made by agent k, for each k ∈ N . The set of
all influence functions is denoted by B.
One of the key concepts of the influence model is the concept of follower. An agent
is said to be follower of a coalition if he always decides according to the inclination of
that coalition, assuming that the coalition in question is unanimously inclined. For any
S ⊆ N , we denote by UIS the set of all inclination vectors under which all members of S
have the same inclination
UIS := {I ∈ {−1,+1}
n : ∀k, j ∈ S [Ik = Ij]}.
1 We can also speak of the influence function of agent k, Bk : {−1,+1}
n → {−1,+1}, I 7→ Bk(I), for each k ∈ N .
3
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In particular, UIk = {−1,+1}
n for any k ∈ N . We denote by IS the value Ik for some
k ∈ S, I ∈ UIS. Formally, for ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and B ∈ B, the set of followers of S under B
is defined as
FB(S) := {j ∈ N : ∀I ∈ UIS [Bj(I) = IS]}.
The cardinality of S will be denoted by s.
We recapitulate three particular influence functions that have been introduced and
investigated in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010a):
– Let n ≥ t > ⌊n
2
⌋ and I+ := {k ∈ N : Ik = +1} for any I ∈ {−1,+1}
n. The majority
influence function Maj[t] ∈ B is defined by
Maj[t](I) :=
{
1N , if |I
+| ≥ t
−1N , if |I
+| < t
, ∀I ∈ {−1,+1}n.
According to the majority influence function if a majority of players has the positive
inclination, then all agents decide +1, otherwise all decide −1. For each S ⊆ N , the
set of followers under the majority function is equal to
FMaj[t](S) =
{
N, if s ≥ t
∅, if s < t,
(1)
i.e., everybody follows a coalition with a cardinality of at least t, and nobody follows
a coalition with less than t members.
– Let k˜ ∈ N be a particular player called the guru. The guru influence function Gur[k˜] ∈
B is defined by
Gur
[k˜]
j (I) := Ik˜, ∀I ∈ {−1,+1}
n, ∀j ∈ N.
Hence, according to this function, when a guru exists, every agent follows the guru.
For each S ⊆ N , the set of followers under the guru function is given by
F
Gur[k˜]
(S) =
{
N, if k˜ ∈ S
∅, if k˜ /∈ S.
(2)
In other words, all agents follow a coalition containing the guru, and nobody follows
a coalition without the guru.
– The identity function Id ∈ B depicts the absence of any influence and is defined by
Id(I) := I, ∀I ∈ {−1,+1}n.
Moreover, we have for each S ⊆ N ,
FId(S) = S, (3)
which means that all members of a coalition and only them follow that coalition.
4
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2.2 Command games and equivalence with influence functions
Next, we present some of the main concepts concerning command games that have orig-
inally been introduced by Hu and Shapley (2003b,a).
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of agents (players, voters). For k ∈ N and S ⊆ N \ k:
– S is a boss set for k if S determines the choice of k;
– S is an approval set for k if k can act with the approval of S.
It is assumed that any superset (in N \ k) of a boss set is a boss set. For each k ∈ N , a
simple game (N,Wk) called the command game for k is created, with the set of winning
coalitions given by
Wk := {S : S is a boss set for k} ∪ {S ∪ k : S is a boss or approval set for k}.
We recover the boss sets for agent k
Bossk = {S ⊆ N \ k : S ∈ Wk} =Wk ∩ 2
N\k
and the approval sets for k
Appk = {S ⊆ N \ k : S ∪ k ∈ Wk but S /∈ Wk}.
Obviously, Bossk ∩Appk = ∅. Given the set of command games Ω = {(N,Wk) : k ∈ N},
for any coalition S ⊆ N , the command function ω(S) is defined as the set of all members
that are commandable by S:
ω(S) := {k ∈ N : S ∈ Wk}.
In Grabisch and Rusinowska (2009) the model of influence is applied to the framework
of command games and the relations between these two frameworks are shown; see also
Grabisch and Rusinowska (Forthcoming 2011). We present one of these relations, i.e., the
equivalence between command games and (command) influence functions.
Let Ω = {(N,Wk) : k ∈ N} be a set of command games, ω(S) be a set of agents
commandable by S, and FB(S) denote the set of followers of S under an influence function
B. The influence function B and the set of command games Ω are said to be equivalent
if FB ≡ ω, i.e., if for each coalition S ⊆ N , the set of followers of S under the influence
function B and the set of agents commandable by S under Ω coincide.
In Grabisch and Rusinowska (2009) we construct command games equivalent to the
influence functions recapitulated in Section 2.1 and determine boss and approval sets for
these command games:
(i) Let n ≥ t > ⌊n
2
⌋ andMaj[t] ∈ B be the majority influence function and let {(N,WMaj
[t]
k ) :
k ∈ N} be a set of command games given by
WMaj
[t]
k = {S ⊆ N : s ≥ t}, ∀k ∈ N.
The majority influence function Maj[t] and the set of command games {(N,WMaj
[t]
k ) :
k ∈ N} are equivalent. In other words, the command games in which winning coalitions
5
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for each player are the ones with the cardinality at least t, n ≥ t > ⌊n
2
⌋, are equivalent
to Maj[t]. Moreover, we have for n > 2, n ≥ t > ⌊n
2
⌋, and k ∈ N
BossMaj
[t]
k = {S ⊆ N : s ≥ t ∧ k /∈ S} (4)
AppMaj
[t]
k = {S ⊆ N : s = t− 1 ∧ k /∈ S}. (5)
In particular, for t = n, k ∈ N ,
BossMaj
[t]
k = ∅, App
Maj[t]
k = N \ k.
(ii) Let Gur[k˜] ∈ B be the guru function with the guru k˜ ∈ N and let {(N,WGur
[k˜]
k ) : k ∈ N}
be a set of command games given by
WGur
[k˜]
k = {S ⊆ N : k˜ ∈ S}, ∀k ∈ N.
The guru function Gur[k˜] and the set of command games {(N,WGur
[k˜]
k ) : k ∈ N} are
equivalent. Hence, the command games in which winning coalitions for each player are
the coalitions containing a certain player k˜, are equivalent to the guru function Gur[k˜]
with the guru k˜. Moreover,
BossGur
[k˜]
k˜
= ∅, AppGur
[k˜]
k˜
= 2N\k˜ (6)
BossGur
[k˜]
k = {S ⊆ N : k˜ ∈ S ∧ k /∈ S}, App
Gur[k˜]
k = ∅, for k 6= k˜. (7)
(iii) Let Id ∈ B be the identity function and let {(N,W Idk ) : k ∈ N} be a set of command
games given by
W Idk = {S ⊆ N : k ∈ S}, ∀k ∈ N.
The identity function Id and the set of command games {(N,W Idk ) : k ∈ N} are
equivalent. This means that the command games, in which for each player k winning
coalitions for k are the coalitions containing k, are equivalent to the identity function.
We have also for each k ∈ N
BossIdk = ∅, App
Id
k = 2
N\k. (8)
3 The dynamic model of influence
3.1 Description of the model and stable states
In order to analyze the dynamic aspects of influence, we consider the following model
introduced originally in Maruani (2010).
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} denote the set of agents. We are interested in the influence of all
n agents on a player i ∈ N . Let ej denote the inclination of agent j ∈ N , where ej = ±1.
Agent i gives to agent j a certain importance which is reflected by a weight pij. This
means that the state (inclination) ej will contribute to the decision of agent i with the
weight cij = pijej. The exhortation Ei obtained by agent i ∈ N is defined by the weighted
6
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sum of the inclinations of all agents, or saying differently, by the weighted sum of the
opinions that i receives from the agents (including his own opinion):
Ei =
∑
j∈N
cij =
∑
j∈N
pijej. (9)
Figure 1 presents the idea of the exhortation.
ej
ei ek
pikek
pijejpjiei
piiei
Ei = pijej + pikek + piiei
Fig. 1. The exhortation
The updating rule is the following. If Ei > 0, then agent i goes to the state +1. If
Ei < 0, then he goes to the state −1, and if Ei = 0, then i stays in his present state.
Hence, pij > 0 corresponds to the stimulation of i by j, pij < 0 corresponds to the
inhibition, and pij = 0 means the absence of relation.
The influence function Bi of agent i ∈ N is defined by
Bi(e) = sgn(Ei), where e = (e1, . . . , en) and sign(Ei) =

1, if Ei > 0
−1, if Ei < 0
ei, if Ei = 0
(10)
Remark 1 In this dynamic model, we can express the influence functions recapitulated
in Section 2.1 as follows:
(i) The majority influence function with t = ⌊n
2
⌋ + 1 in which every agent plays a role
can be represented by pij =
1
n
.
(ii) The guru function with the guru k˜ in which every agent is influenced only by the guru
can be represented by pij = 0 for each j 6= k˜ and pik˜ = 1.
(iii) The identity function in which every agent influences only himself can be represented
by pij = δij.
Stable states of the system satisfy e
(k+1)
i = e
(k)
i for each i ∈ N , starting from a certain
k, where k is the number of iteration and e
(k)
i denotes the inclination (state) of i at time
k. This means that the state ei and the exhortation Ei have the same sign, and therefore
eiEi > 0. In other words, the stable states satisfy the following inequality:∑
j∈N
pijeiej > 0 for each i ∈ N.
7
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The evolution of the population can be expressed by
e
(k+1)
i = Bi(e
(k)
1 , e
(k)
2 , . . . , e
(k)
j , . . . , e
(k)
n ) (11)
where Bi is the influence function of voter i ∈ N . A stable state satisfies therefore
e
(k)
i = Bi(e
(k)
1 , e
(k)
2 , . . . , e
(k)
j , . . . , e
(k)
n ).
An obvious way to get stability is to forbid any relation between agents, i.e., to assign
the weights as pij = δij .
3.2 Dynamic of the model in the continuous framework
Let us consider an extension of the dynamic influence model to the continuous framework;
see also Maruani (2010). The influence function remains
e
(k+1)
i = sgn
(
E
(k)
i
)
which together with E
(k)
i =
∑
j∈N pije
(k)
j can be written as
e
(k+1)
i − e
(k)
i
(k + 1)− k
= sgn
(∑
j
pije
(k)
j
)
− e
(k)
i . (12)
For a small time step, we can make the approximation
e
(k+1)
i − e
(k)
i
(k + 1)− k
≈
dei
dt
(13)
and also the approximation
sgn
(∑
j
pijej
)
≈ tanh
(
a
∑
j
pijej
)
(14)
where the parameter a controls the tendency towards the function sgn. This approxi-
mation keeps the properties of the function sgn that are essential for our analysis: it is
increasing and bounded between −1 and 1 and nullifies in 0.
¿From (12), (13), and (14), in order to study the dynamic of the model, we need to
solve the following system:
dei
dt
+ ei = tanh
(
a
∑
j
pijej
)
, i = 1, . . . , n (15)
and then put ei = sgn [ei(t)]. In Section 4 we apply this dynamic approach of differential
equations to classical influence functions. The results that we present have been originally
shown in Maruani (2010).
8
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4 The dynamic of selected influence functions
4.1 The majority influence function with t = ⌊n
2
⌋+ 1
As mentioned in Remark 1(i), the majority influence function with t = ⌊n
2
⌋ + 1 can be
represented by the weights pij =
1
n
. The system (15) of differential equations that we
need to solve is therefore
dei
dt
+ ei = tanh
(
a
n
∑
j
ej
)
, i = 1, . . . , n. (16)
The dynamic approach allows for the analysis of the influence model introduced in
Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010c) in which agents have a continuum of actions, i.e., the
set of all inclinations is equal to an interval [x, y], where x, y ∈ R.
Lemma 1 For a > 1, the differential equation dx
dt
+ x = tanh(ax) has an unstable fixed
point in 0 and another stable fixed point.
Proof: In the equation
dx
dt
+ x = tanh(ax)
we put ax = y. Hence,
dy
dt
+ y = a tanh(y) =
1
p
tanh(y)
with p = 1
a
. The fixed points satisfy tanh(y) = py. There is always y = 0 and another
fixed point y0 iff p < 1 (a > 1). We are interested in the stability of fixed points. In the
neighborhood of y = 0
dy
dt
+ y =
1
p
tanh(y) ≈
y
p
dy
dt
+
p− 1
p
y = 0
y(t) = y(0) exp
1− p
p
t
For 0 < p < 1 the origin is unstable.
In the neighborhood of y0, we put y(t) = y0 + ε(t)
dy
dt
+ y =
1
p
tanh(y)
dε
dt
+ y0 + ε(t) =
1
p
tanh (y0 + ε(t))
=
1
p
tanh(y0) + tanh (ε(t))
1 + tanh(y0) tanh (ε(t))
=
1
p
py0 + tanh (ε(t))
1 + py0 tanh (ε(t))
9
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where we have used py0 = tanh(y0). A first order approximation yields
dε
dt
+ y0 + ε(t) ≈
1
p
py0 + ε(t)
1 + py0ε(t)
≈
1
p
[py0 + ε(t)] [1− py0ε(t)]
≈ y0 − py
2
0ε(t) +
ε(t)
p
and ultimately
dε
dt
+
(
1 + py20 −
1
p
)
ε(t) = 0
If
(
1 + py20 −
1
p
)
> 0, then the solution is the decreasing exponential and point y0 is
stable. Let us show that
(
1 + py20 −
1
p
)
> 0. Let
A = 1 + py20 −
1
p
py0 = tanh(y0)
A = 1 + y0 tanh(y0)−
y0
tanh(y0)
= 1 + y0
[
tanh(y0)−
1
tanh(y0)
]
= 1 + y0
[
tanh2(y0)− 1
tanh(y0)
]
= 1− y0
[
1
cosh2(y0) tanh(y0)
]
= 1− y0
[
1
cosh(y0) sinh(y0)
]
= 1−
2y0
sinh(2y0)
= 1−
u
sinh(u)
We have
sinh(u)
u
= 1 +
u2
3!
+
u4
5!
+ ...
sinh(u)
u
> 1 ⇒ 1−
u
sinh(u)
> 0.

Proposition 1 If agents make their decisions according to the majority influence func-
tion with t = ⌊n
2
⌋+ 1, then the decision of each agent converges to the sign of the sum of
the agents’ inclinations.
Proof: Let us consider the system
dei
dt
+ ei = tanh
[
a
n
∑
j
ej(t)
]
, i = 1, . . . , n.
10
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With εi =
a
n
ei, we have, for each i,
dεi
dt
+ εi =
a
n
tanh
[∑
j
εj(t)
]
Adding term by term the equations of the system, the sum S(t) =
∑
j εj(t) satisfies
dS
dt
+ S = a tanh [S(t)]
According to Lemma 1, S converges to a stable fixed point S∞, which satisfies for a > 1
S∞ = a tanh(S∞)
The system that we consider becomes
dεi
dt
+ εi =
a
n
tanh [S(t)] .
By changing the function εi(t) = Ei(t) exp(−t) (εi(0) = Ei(0)), we get the equation
dEi
dt
=
a
n
exp(t) tanh [S(t)]
whose general solution is
Ei(t) = Ei(0) +
a
n
∫ t
0
exp(u) tanh [S(u)] du
The solution for εi is therefore
εi(t) = εi(0) exp(−t) +
a
n
exp(−t)
∫ t
0
exp(u) tanh [S(u)] du (17)
We are interested in the asymptotic form of the solution. The first term of the right hand
side of (17) vanishes. Let us denote by ηi the second term, i.e.,
ηi(t) =
a
n
exp(−t)
∫ t
0
exp(u) tanh [S(u)] du
Let us fix for the moment some T . Then, for t > T we decompose the integral in two
terms
ηi(t) =
a
n
exp(−t)
[∫ T
0
exp(u) tanh [S(u)] du+
∫ t
T
exp(u) tanh [S(u)] du
]
= η
(1)
i (t) + η
(2)
i (t)
and consider successively the two components. We analyze the first term
η
(1)
i (t) =
a
n
exp(−t)
∫ T
0
exp(u) tanh [S(u)] du
11
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The tanh is bounded by 1, so we have∣∣∣∣∫ T
0
exp(u) tanh [S(u)] du
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∫ T
0
exp(u)du = exp(T )− 1
Given T , exp(T )− 1 is a fixed number and we denote it by B. Then∣∣∣η(1)i (t)∣∣∣ ≤ aBn exp(−t)
and therefore
lim
t→∞
η
(1)
i (t) = 0
The second term is
η
(2)
i (t) =
a
n
exp(−t)
∫ t
T
exp(u) tanh [S(u)] du
For u large enough, which is the case, S(u) is close to S∞. By continuity tanh [S(u)] is
close to tanh (S∞), which is equal to
S∞
a
. It is then appropriate to choose T as follows.
Setting
tanh [S(u)] =
S∞
a
[1 + δ(u)]
introduces the function δ(u) which vanishes at infinity. The free parameter T is then
chosen such that for any given positive ε and for t > T , |δ(t)| < nε
|S∞|
. We have then
η
(2)
i (t) =
a
n
exp(−t)
∫ t
T
exp(u) tanh [S(u)] du
=
a
n
exp(−t)
∫ t
T
exp(u)
S∞
a
[1 + δ(u)] du
=
S∞
n
exp(−t)
∫ t
T
exp(u)du+
S∞
n
exp(−t)
∫ t
T
δ(u) exp(u)du
=
S∞
n
(1− exp(T − t)) + ϕ(t)
where the asymptotic value of the first term is S∞
n
, and the second term is
ϕ(t) =
S∞
n
exp(−t)
∫ t
T
δ(u) exp(u)du
|ϕ(t)| ≤
S∞
n
exp(−t)
∫ t
T
exp(u)
nε
|S∞|
du
≤ ε exp(−t)
∫ t
T
exp(u)du
≤ ε
The asymptotic value of εi is then
S∞
n
, and the asymptotic value of
∑
j εj is
∑n
j=1
S∞
n
=
S∞. 
12
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.22
Remark 2 (The majority vote decreases costs)
The fixed points of the differential system dek
dt
= gk(e1, e2, ..., en), k = 1, . . . , n satisfy by
definition dek
dt
= 0, k = 1, . . . , n, which is equivalent to
∑
k
(
dek
dt
)2
= 0.
Let us suppose the existence of a function G of n variables such that for each k
gk(e1, e2, ..., en) = −
∂G
∂ek
and calculate
dG
dt
=
∑
k
∂G
∂ek
dek
dt
= −
∑
k
gk
dek
dt
= −
∑
k
(
dek
dt
)2
≤ 0
which means that G is decreasing in time and reaches its minimum when each dek
dt
= 0,
i.e., for the fixed point of the system. We have
dek
dt
+ ek = fk(e1, e2, ..., en) ⇒
dek
dt
= fk(e1, e2, ..., en)− ek (gk = fk − ek)
Let us apply this to our differential system (16), letting εk =
a
n
ek:
dεk
dt
=
a
n
tanh
[∑
j
εj(t)
]
− εk
(all f being identical). We multiply both sides of each differential equation by dεk
dt(
dεk
dt
)2
=
a
n
dεk
dt
tanh
[∑
j
εj(t)
]
− εk
dεk
dt
and obtain ∑
k
(
dεk
dt
)2
=
{
a
n
tanh
[∑
j
εj(t)
]}∑
k
dεk
dt
−
∑
k
εk
dεk
dt
With S(t) =
∑
k εk(t) we have then∑
k
(
dεk
dt
)2
=
a
n
dS
dt
tanh [S(t)]−
1
2
d
∑
k(εk)
2
dt
Note that
dS
dt
tanh [S(t)] =
1
cosh [S(t)]
d
dt
cosh [S(t)] =
d
dt
ln {cosh [S(t)]}
Hence, up to some unessential additive constant, we get the cost function
G(ε1, ε2, ..., εn) =
1
2
∑
k
ε2k(t)−
a
n
ln
{
cosh
[∑
k
εk(t)
]}
.
13
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4.2 The guru function and the identity function
As mentioned in Remark 1(ii), the guru function with the guru k˜ can be represented by
∀j 6= k˜, pij = 0, pik˜ = 1.
The system of differential equations given in (15) that we need to solve becomes
dei
dt
+ ei = tanh(aek˜), i = 1, . . . , n. (18)
One can see that, on the one hand, the guru evolves only according to its own in-
clinations, and on the other hand, for all the remaining agents the guru evolution acts
as a forcing term. The respective evolution equations of the agents differ only in their
respective initial values. Hence, the following Proposition 2 is coherent with the intuition:
Proposition 2 If agents make their decisions according to the guru function, then the
decision of each agent converges to the inclination of the guru.
Proof: Let g0 6= 0 be a stable fixed point of the equation
dy
dt
+y = a tanh(y) (it exists by
virtue of Lemma 1). This means that asymptotically (in long term) we can write, letting
g = ek˜ for simplicity:
g(t) = g0 + γ(t)
where pg0 = tanh(g0), p =
1
a
, and γ(t) converges to zero with t tending to infinity. There
exists t0 such that for t > t0, γ(t) <
ǫ
pg0
. For each agent i, we have
dei
dt
+ ei =
1
p
tanh[g(t)] =
1
p
tanh [g0 + γ(t)]
=
1
p
tanh(g0) + tanh [γ(t)]
1 + tanh(g0) tanh [γ(t)]
≈
1
p
pg0 + γ(t)
1 + pg0γ(t)
≈
1
p
[pg0 + γ(t)] [1− pg0γ(t)]
≈
1
p
(
pg0 − (pg0)
2 γ(t) + γ(t)
)
= g0 +Bγ(t)
where we used that 1
1+ǫ
= 1− ǫ (|ǫ| ≪ 1).
The value B is not important. The change of the function ei(t) = g0 + zi(t) (the aim
is to show that zi(t) converges to 0) gives
dzi
dt
+ zi = Bγ(t)
We will show that limt→∞ zi(t) = 0. Let us consider the equation
dz
dt
+ z(t) = Bγ(t)
The homogeneous solution is
z(t) = z0 exp(−t)
14
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.22
For t > t0 the particular solution is of the form
z(t) = u(t) exp(−t)
and it must satisfy
dz
dt
+ z(t) =
du
dt
exp(−t)
du
dt
= Bγ(t) exp(t)
We have
u(t) = B
∫ t
t0
γ(u) exp(u)du
The general solution is therefore of the form
z(t) = z0 exp(−t) + u(t) exp(−t) = z0 exp(−t) + B exp(−t)
∫ t
t0
γ(u) exp(u)du
Asymptotically, the exponential disappears and
z(t) = B exp(−t)
∫ t
t0
γ(u) exp(u)du
Hence, ∣∣∣∣∫ t
t0
γ(u) exp(u)du
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣ ǫpg0
∫ t
t0
exp(u)du
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∫ t
t0
γ(u) exp(u)du
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫpg0 [exp(t)− exp(t0)]
and therefore
|z(t)| ≤
Bǫ
pg0
exp(−t) [exp(t)− exp(t0)] =
Bǫ
pg0
[1− exp(t0 − t)]
and
|z(t)| ≤
Bǫ
pg0
.
Since this converges to zero, we have for each i,
ei(t) = g0 + zi(t)→ g0.

As mentioned in Remark 1(iii), the identity function can be represented by pij = δij .
The system of differential equations that we need to solve for each i is
dei
dt
+ ei = tanh(aei).
Proposition 3 If agents make their decisions according to the identity function, then
the decision of each agent converges to his own inclination.
Proof: Evident from Lemma 1. 
15
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5 Followers in the dynamic model
As recapitulated in Section 2.1, followers of a coalition S are the agents who always
follow the inclination of S, assuming that S is unanimously inclined. The set of followers
of coalition S under the influence function B is therefore defined as
FB(S) := {i ∈ N : ∀e ∈ ES [Bi(e) = eS]},
where in our model, Bi(e) = sgn
(∑
j pijej
)
.
In order to determine the followers for every influence function B, first we consider a
particular case with S = {e1}. Agent i is the follower of S if and only if
∀e ∈ E, sgn
(∑
j
pijej
)
= sgn(e1)
⇔ ∀e ∈ E, e1
∑
j
pijej > 0
⇔ ∀e ∈ E, pi1 + e1
∑
j≥2
pijej > 0
⇔ pi1 >
∑
j≥2
|pij|
Proposition 4 Agent i is the follower of coalition S if and only if∑
j∈S
pij >
∑
j /∈S
|pij|.
Proof: In the general case, agent i is the follower of S if and only if
∀e ∈ ES, sgn
(∑
j
pijej
)
= sgn(ek) = sgn(el) = ... for each ek, el ∈ S
⇔ ∀e ∈ ES, ek
∑
j
pijej > 0
⇔ ∀e ∈ ES,
∑
j∈S
pij + ek
∑
j /∈S
pijej > 0
⇔
∑
j∈S
pij >
∑
j /∈S
|pij|

Note that for |S| = 1, if pik < 0 for each i, then FB(ek) = ∅.
Let us apply Proposition 4 to the majority influence function with t = ⌊n
2
⌋ + 1. We
have pij =
1
n
for each i, j. For each S, agent i is the follower of coalition S if and only if∑
j∈S
pij >
∑
j /∈S
|pij| ⇔
|S|
n
>
n− |S|
n
⇔ |S| >
n
2
.
16
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This shows that in case of the majority influence function, the followers of S depend only
on the cardinality of S and
FMaj[t](S) =
{
N, if s > n
2
∅, if s ≤ n
2
where s = |S|, which is coherent with (1).
Let player k˜ be the guru. We have then for each i
pij =
{
0 if j 6= k˜
1 if j = k˜.
Hence, ∑
j∈S
pij =
{
1 if k˜ ∈ S
0 if k˜ /∈ S
,
∑
j /∈S
|pij| =
{
0 if k˜ ∈ S
1 if k˜ /∈ S
and therefore ∑
j∈S
pij >
∑
j /∈S
|pij| ⇔ k˜ ∈ S. (19)
This result shows that in case of the guru function, the followers of S depend only on the
presence of the guru in coalition S. We get then
F
Gur[k˜]
(S) =
{
N, if k˜ ∈ S
∅, if k˜ /∈ S
which is equal to (2).
For the identity function pij = δij for each i, j. We have
∑
j∈S
pij =
{
1 if i ∈ S
0 if i /∈ S
,
∑
j /∈S
|pij| =
{
0 if i ∈ S
1 if i /∈ S
.
Hence, ∑
j∈S
pij >
∑
j /∈S
|pij| ⇔ i ∈ S. (20)
This means that the followers of S under the identity function are the players of S and
only them, i.e.,
FId(S) = S
which confirms (3).
6 Boss and approval sets in the dynamic model
Using our dynamic model, we can also determine the boss and approval sets of command
games. We have the following:
17
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Proposition 5 (i) S ⊆ N \ i is the boss set for agent i if and only if
∀e ∈ E,
∑
j∈S
pij >
∑
j /∈S
|pij|.
(ii) S ⊆ N \ i is the approval set for agent i if and only if
∀e ∈ E,
{∑
j∈S pij + pii >
∑
i6=j /∈S |pij|∑
j∈S pij ≤
∑
j /∈S |pij|.
Proof: It is clear from the proof of Proposition 4. 
Let us apply Proposition 5 to the majority influence function with t = ⌊n
2
⌋ + 1. We
have pij =
1
n
for each i, j. S is the boss set for agent i if and only if∑
j∈S
pij >
∑
j /∈S
|pij| ⇔
|S|
n
>
n− |S|
n
⇔ |S| >
n
2
.
We have therefore
BossMaj
[t]
i =
{
S ⊆ N \ i : s >
n
2
}
which is coherent with (4).
S is the approval set for agent i if and only if
∀e ∈ E,
{∑
j∈S pij + pii >
∑
i6=j /∈S |pij|∑
j∈S pij ≤
∑
j /∈S |pij|
⇔
{
s
n
+ 1
n
> n−s−1
n
s
n
≤ n−s
n
We have therefore
AppMaj
[t]
i =
{
S ⊆ N \ i : s = ⌊
n
2
⌋
}
which is coherent with (5).
Let k˜ be the guru. By virtue of Proposition 5(i) and (19), we have
BossGur
[k˜]
k˜
= ∅ and BossGur
[k˜]
k = {S ⊆ N \ k : k˜ ∈ S} for k 6= k˜.
Using Proposition 5(ii), we conclude that S is the approval set for agent i if and only if
pii = pk˜k˜ = 1. Hence, every set not containing k˜ is the approval set for k˜, and every agent
different from k˜ has the empty approval set:
AppGur
[k˜]
k˜
= 2N\k˜ and AppGur
[k˜]
k = ∅ for k 6= k˜.
We get therefore the results given in (6) and (7).
For the identity function, we have pij = δij for each i, j. Using Proposition 5(i) and
(20), we get BossIdi = ∅. By virtue of Proposition 5(ii), we conclude that S is the approval
set for agent i if and only if pii = 1, that is, each set not containing i is the approval set
for i. Hence, AppIdi = 2
N\i, which gives exactly (8).
18
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7 Conclusions
The paper concerns the influence model originally introduced in Hoede and Bakker (1982)
and later studied in several of our previous works. We have proposed a new approach
to analyze the dynamic of the model. This approach is based on the use of differential
equations. To the best of our knowledge, the differential equations approach has never
been applied to this influence model before.
To be more precise, we have introduced a dynamic model of influence in which an
agent may give a certain importance to other agents in making his final decision. This
importance is reflected by a weight which, depending of the sign (positive, negative or
zero), corresponds to the stimulation, the inhibition, and the absence of relation, respec-
tively. We have defined the exhortation obtained by an agent as the weighted sum of the
opinions that the agent receives from the others. The updating rule is based on the sign
of the exhortation: its positive (negative) value means going to the positive (negative)
state, and the exhortation equal to zero corresponds to staying in the present state.
The main ideas of the application of this approach to the model of influence is to switch
to the continuum case and to apply some approximations allowing the use of differential
equations systems. The solutions of these systems give the same results obtained earlier
for the classical influence functions. Moreover, the approach allows the study of new
concepts, like e.g. the weighted majority function. It also leads to the results on followers
obtained for the discrete case, and to the results on the boss and approval sets of command
games.
In the paper we have shown that if the majority function is used, then the decision of
each agent converges to the sign of the sum of the agents’ inclinations, and in case of the
guru function, the decision of each agent converges to the inclination of the guru. Under
the identity function, the agents’ decisions converge obviously to their own inclinations.
Furthermore, we have described the necessary and sufficient condition that an agent is the
follower of a coalition in the dynamic framework. We have used that result to determine
the sets of followers for the majority function, the guru function, and the identity function.
We have also determined the necessary and sufficient conditions that a coalition is the
boss set or the approval set for an agent in the dynamic model. We have applied these
results to determine the boss and approval sets of command games equivalent to the
three influence functions in question: the majority influence function, the guru function,
and the identity function. Both in the case of followers and boss and approval sets, the
conditions depend on the relation(s) between the weights that reflect the importance
given by the agents to the inclinations of the others in making their own decisions.
There are several possible research issues related to this model that could still be
raised. In the future research on this framework, it would be interesting to study, in
particular, non-linear influence functions and to consider temporary effects in the behavior
of a group of agents.
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